

Market Design Perspectives on Inequality

Scott Duke Kominers

Reading List

Pre-Reading/Introduction.

- Alvin E. Roth. The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics. *Econometrica*, 70:1341–1378, 2002.
- Parag A. Pathak and Tayfun Sönmez. Leveling the playing field: Sincere and sophisticated players in the Boston mechanism. *American Economic Review*, 98:1636–1652, 2008.

The Market Design Approach.

- Alvin E. Roth. Deferred acceptance algorithms: History, theory, practice, and open questions. *International Journal of Game Theory*, 36:537–569, 2008.
- Alvin E. Roth. What have we learned from market design? In Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth, and Zvika Neeman, editors, *The Handbook of Market Design*, pages 7–50. Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Alvin E. Roth. *Who Gets What – And Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015.
- Paul Milgrom. *Putting Auction Theory to Work*. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Parag A. Pathak and Tayfun Sönmez. School admissions reform in Chicago and England: Comparing mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. *American Economic Review*, 103:80–106, 2013.
- Shengwu Li. Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms. Stanford University Working Paper, 2015.
- Benjamin N. Roth and Ran I. Shorrer. Mechanism design in the presence of a pre-existing game. MIT Working Paper, 2015.
- Jonathan M. V. Davis and B. Pablo Montagnes. Organizational market design. University of Chicago Working Paper, 2015.
- John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima, and Scott Duke Kominers. Strategy-proofness, investment efficiency, and marginal returns: An equivalence. Becker Friedman Institute Working Paper, 2015.

Specific Applications.

- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez. School choice: A mechanism design approach. *American Economic Review*, 93:729–747, 2003.
- Isa Emin Hafalir, M. Bumin Yenmez, and Muhammed Ali Yildirim. Effective affirmative action in school choice. *Theoretical Economics*, 8:325–363, 2013.
- Umut Dur and M. Utku Ünver. Two-sided matching via balanced exchange: Tuition and worker exchanges. Boston College Working Paper, 2015.

- Tayfun Sönmez. Bidding for army career specialties: Improving the ROTC branching mechanism. *Journal of Political Economy*, 121:186–219, 2013.
- Will Jones and Alexander Teytelboym. The local refugee match: Aligning refugees’ preferences with the capacities and priorities of localities. Oxford University Working Paper, 2016.
- Vincent W. Slauch, Mustafa Akan, Onur Kesten, and M. Utku Ünver. The Pennsylvania adoption exchange improves its matching process. Boston College Working Paper, 2014.
- Neil Thakral. Matching with stochastic arrival. Harvard University Working Paper, 2015.
- Canice Prendergast. The allocation of food to food banks. Booth School of Business Working Paper, 2015.
- Gary S. Becker, Julio J. Elias, and Karen Ye. The shortage of kidneys for transplant: Altruism, exchanges, opt in versus opt out, and the market for kidneys. Becker Friedman Institute Working Paper, 2013.
- Itai Ashlagi, David Gamarnik, Michael Rees, and Alvin E. Roth. The need for (long) chains in kidney exchange. NBER Working Paper No. 18202, 2012.
- Robert Slonim, Carmen Wang, and Ellen Garbarino. The market for blood. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 28:177–96, 2014.
- Amanda Pallais. Inefficient hiring in entry-level labor markets. *American Economic Review*, 104:3565–3599, 2014.
- Alexander Gelber, Adam Isen, and Judd B. Kessler. The effects of youth employment: Evidence from New York City Summer Youth Employment Program lotteries. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, forthcoming.